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The Depiction of Law in African Literary Texts
Emmanuel Yewah
A quick survey of oral literature and African literatures written
in received languages reveals an overwhelming amount of works dealing
with legal subject matters and an almost obsessive appeal to legal stories
by African writers. In spite of that recurrent depiction of court scenes or
situations, interdisciplinary scholarship that brings together African
literatures and the various traditions in the law, from which a good
number of the writers draw part of their inspiration, remains rare. As I
have stated elsewhere, such lack of interest could be attributed to a
number of reasons: the unease by literary scholars to venture into a
relatively unsafe and somewhat intimidating space, a long desire on the
part of legal scholars and practitioners of the law to maintain and defend
the autonomy of the discipline,' even though, as Christopher Norris
points out, "recent trends show that disciplinary boundaries are
beginning to break down and legal discourses no longer
possess anything
2
like the sovereign autonomy it has always claimed.,
This study attempts to fill that important gap in African
intellectual history by breaking disciplinary boundaries to show, through
textual analyses, how legal stories have been inscribed in literary texts.
These inscriptions, given that they are framed within a somewhat legal
context, help to establish the legality of the stories themselves. However,
those stories, besides illuminating some aspects of the law, might,
indeed, subvert both the indigenous and the received traditions in the law
or might be used to critically inquire into the various institutions
impacted by those traditions.
A major purpose of this work is to use selected African literary
texts to explore the various strategies by which those texts attempt to
undo, indeed, deconstruct legal structures and traditions by
superimposing what is clearly the inner workings and mechanism of
indigenous courts on Western court setting. For instance, court
participants are allowed to tell their stories unrestrictedly, that is,
"without evidentiary constraints." 3 It will also be shown that undoing or
subversion of the judging process takes one of two forms: introducing
into the process one or more witnesses, each telling his/her own personal
story unrestrictedly and with no relevance to the case in point; or
1 Emmanuel Yewah, Court Stories in Selected African Short Narratives, 26(4)

RESEARCH IN

AFRICAN LITERATURES 172 (1995).

2 Christopher Norris, Law, Deconstruction and the Resistance to Theory, in Deconstruction Of
Theory 126, 127 (1984).
3 JOHN CONLEY, & WILLIAM O'BARR, RULES VERSUS RELATIONSHIP: THE ETHNOGRAPHY OF LEGAL

DISCOURSE, 36 (1990).
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presenting a defendant who has opted for silence in his own trial. In that
case he does not tell any story that might be used as evidence. For as
James Chandler and others have noted, facts or stories "can only become
evidence in response to some particular question.",4 Moreover, this study
will examine the courtroom as depicted in some of the texts not so much
as a place to resolve social contradictions but a space in which the
colonized, represented by the masses, generate the power to structure
anti-hegemonic, anti-colonialist, and anti-dictatorial discourses and to
develop alternative legal ideologies to the dominant ones of society.
It will be argued further that these transgressive narratives,
especially in the case of the received traditions in the law, help break
down the restrictions imposed by the rules of evidence legal system,
thereby empowering court participants by allowing them the freedom to
turn the courtroom into a lieu par excellence of free play, a lieu to engage
in what I have called legalized subversion. In such a "de-sacralized"
space (the sacredness of the awe-inspiring courtroom is broken), it is
possible to bring into the judicial process those contextual elements
(politics, religion, history, personal stories, and even the role of ancestral
spirits) that have been excluded due to evidentiary prohibitions or in
defense of disciplinary autonomy. Having thus deconstructed the
structure of the received legal system and raised concerns about the
indigenous, the question posed by all the texts under consideration is
whether truth(s) can ever be determined? Indeed, can justice, which is
the ultimate goal in each trial, ever be achieved or, is it something
constantly being manipulated by some unknown forces and, therefore, in
a permanent state of deferment? Given all the issues raised, the bigger
question still remains, how do these texts, inspired by two or more
traditions in the law, conceive of justice?
This study contextualizes its analysis by linking the ideas
generated by the texts, by the stories produced in the courtroom or any
other court setting to the context of their production. Additionally, it
draws its critical tools from various literary theories that have become an
integral part of literary theory. More importantly, this project has been
inspired by the pioneering scholarship of the critical legal studies
movement, whose work, interdisciplinary or, indeed, revisionary in its
approach to legal studies, attempts to explore the many links between
law and literature. The primary goal of this movement, whose proponents
and critics cut across academic disciplines, is to challenge, what Sanford
Levinson and Steven Mailloux have called in another context,
"established boundaries and disciplinary demarcations." 5 It questions the
notion of intentionality in a legal text, or in the words of Christopher
4 James Chandler, et al. 18 Critical Inquiry at 297 (1992).
5 SANFORD LEVINSON & STEVEN MAILOUX, INTERPRETING LAW AN LITERATURE: A HERMENEUTIC

READER, xi (1989).
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Norris "the authority of origins." '6 It is highly critical of legal practice for

its extreme faith in textual evidence, that is, its reliance on the word on
the page as all the evidence and also its "blind respect for tradition and
precedent.", 7 Similarities could be drawn here with literary theory and its
ongoing debate on the idea of intentionality, the canon, and the Formalist
notion of treating a text as a self-referential, self-sufficient, and closed
world divorced from the various contexts of its production. It argues,
quite passionately, as critics have done with respect to literary texts, that
to read a legal text, as closely as lawyers do, with the intent of
discovering or uncovering a single immanent meaning buried in the text
[by its framers], or to uphold the decidability of meaning in such a text
is, in itself, an intentional fallacy.
It recognizes that law is a social institution with the implication
that rather than operating as a closed, self referential entity, law should
be understood in Peter Goodrich's words as "a social practice" or "a
process or set of processes ... a discourse which is inevitably answerable
or responsible, like any other discourse, for its place and role within the
ethical, political and sexual commitments of its times."8 In other words,
Goodrich writes, "law and legal texts are to be treated as accessible and
as committed, precisely because they are in themselves contingent, rather
than universal-even if their historical variability is limited-and
because the social or cultural value attributed to legal discourse
changes-albeit slowly. 9" Indeed for those revisionists, reading a legal
text, just as reading a literary text, becomes an interpretive activity
whose outcome might be an indeterminacy of meaning, or at best, the
discovery of a multiplicity of meanings. For those critics, "legal
reasoning," in the words of David Kairys, "does not provide concrete,
real answers to particular legal or social problems..." The ultimate basis
for a decision, he contends, "is a social and political judgment
incorporating a variety of factors . . .The decision is not based on, or
determined by, legal reasoning."10
Although it takes its origin in the West and has remained largely
the purview of academics, I find its interdisciplinary approach to legal
studies, its determination to break down what Michel Foucault calls
"specialized knowledges,"1' its emphasis on the reader as producer of
6 Norris, supra note 2, at 126.
7 Id.
8 Peter Goodrich, Law as Social Discourse II, in Legal Discourse: Studies In Linguistics, Rhetoric
And Legal Analysis 158, 159 (1987).
9 Id.
10 DAVID KAIRYS, Law and Politics, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 243, 244 (1984).
11 Michel Foucault quoted in IAN WARD, LAW AND LITERATURE: POSSIBILITIES AND
PERSPECTIVES

19 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1995).
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meanings, and its privileging of "creative interpretation" of legal texts
over the "original intent" of the speaker to be very useful critical tools
that could be used to open up the field of African literatures and to
provide new avenues for innovative research. More importantly, these
tools could be employed to express the African worldview; a worldview
that traditionally does not recognize the very notion of 'disciplines' let
alone compartmentalizing them. The critical legal studies' call for legal
studies to transcend what they perceive as parochialism or "narrow
professionalism", in order to explore the connections between law and
literature/theory, has led to some of the most fascinating and innovative
interdisciplinary studies ever. In that light, suffice it to mention here
James Boyd White 12 whose writings and lectures were instrumental in
defining the mission of the law as literature or law and literature
movement. I should mention here Richard Posner 3 whose rejection of
the notion of law as literature and opposition to the use of literary theory
for the interpretation of law has contributed to the ongoing debate on the
educative potential of integrating literature in legal studies.
While both critics have brought out important connections
between law and literature in spite of their disagreement on certain
issues, Brook Thomas is more concerned with the dangers of misreading
the cross-breeding of literature and law by opening the law up such that
it is seen merely as reflection of its social context rather than an integral
part of society. Such a reflection theory remains the dominant critical
approach to the reading of African literatures among some critics today.
This has led some dictators who see themselves reflected in some texts to
mobilize their censoring machinery. However, as Thomas is quick to
caution, many members of the critical legal studies who encourage
interpreting the law in its given social context "recognize the limitations
of a reflection theory which explains the law as a mirror of a society's
existing power structure. 14 He goes from such limitations to draw an
important parallel between law and literature. He argues, quite
convincingly, that "Law is not merely a reflection of social conditions, it
remains a social text that responds to its historical situation by finding
ways to resolve social conflicts.""i As for literature, he agrees with critics

12 See James Boyd White, Law as Language:ReadingLaw and Reading Literature,60 TEX L. REV.
415 (1982).
13 See RICHARD POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION, 254-263
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1998) (for his "hardened opposition to using literary theory
for the interpretation of legal texts.")
14 BROOK THOMAS, CROSS-EXAMINATION OF LAW AND LITERATURE: COOPER, HAWTHORNE, STOW
AND MELVILLE, 4 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1987).

15 Id. at4
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who have argued that a literary work is "an imaginative response
to its
16
historical situation, rather than a reflection of that situation.,
In addition to the numerous links between literature and law that
the critical legal studies movement and their critics have identified, both
disciplines do share another very important element, that is, storytelling.
In the courtroom, litigants and their witnesses tell stories just as the
writer does. Referring to what they call the new storytellers, David
Farber and Suzanna Sherry say they "believe that stories have a
persuasive power that transcends rational argument." 17 Stories, these
critics contend, "'explode' 'stock stories' or 'received knowledge',
'disrupt' the established order, 'shatter complacency,' and 'seduce the
reader.'1 8 They provide a 'flash of recognition' and 'resonate' with the
reader's experience. Outsiders' stories recount the experiences of those
who have 'seen and felt the falsity of the liberal promise."' 19 Lance
Bennett's lucid essay explores storytelling in ways that are appropriate
here. As he writes, a story "is a reconstruction of an event in the light of
the teller's initial perception and immediate judgments about the
audience, the interest that appears to be at stake, and, perhaps most
importantly, what has gone before in the situation in which the story is
presented.,20 Stories told by litigants may help to shape society's
thinking or raise its consciousness about the need to revise existing rules
in accordance with its socio-political, economic and historical situations.
While those stories are vital, if astutely manipulated, however,
they can also be used to destabilize, or to borrow from Derrida, to 'undo'
the entire legal system "while analyzing the structure of the different
layers of [its] structure to know how it has been built., 21 What follows
is, indeed, African writers' use of their knowledge of both traditions in
the law and their poetic license to create legal discourses that illuminate
or subvert various institutions of their society including the legal
institutions themselves.
Alexandre Kum'a Ndumbe's LE SOLEIL DE L'AURORE
depicts life under colonial rule and the transition to a dictatorship, both
systems of oppression, with all that is associated with oppressive
16 Id. at 6
17 Id.
18 DANIEL FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, LEGAL STORYTELLING AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE

MEDIUM AND THE MESSAGE, LAW'S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW 42 (Peter

Brooks & Paul Gerwitz eds. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996).
19 Id.
20 Lance Bennett, Storytelling in Criminal Trials: a model of Social Judgment, 64 Q. J. of SPEECH
20(1978).
21 IMRE SALUSINZSKY, CRITICISM IN SOCIETY: INTERVIEWS WITH JACQUES DERRIDA 164 (Imre

Salusinzsky ed., New York: Methuen 1987).
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regimes: arbitrary use of power; power possessed by the leader rather
than relational or shared by society; psychologically unstable as in
'uneasy lies the head that dictates;' omnipotent dictator, extremely
'allergic' to intellectuals; extremist reaction to imagined and imaginary
threat to the power structure. In the fear-pervading atmosphere of the
text, the leader of the rebellion, one nameless character, simply known
by the generic name of "le frhre du prdsident,"(the president's brother) is
arrested on a trumped-up charge of subversion and brought before the
dictator, who happens to be his own brother. However, when the
dictator's attempt to make him compromise his intransigent position fails
and he is brought to trial. Following a sham trial described by the
accused as "cette parodie de justice," [this parody of justice] "un proc~s
de pure forme" [a mock trial], a trial in which he opts for silence as a
way of subverting the evidentiary process, he is found guilty to have
committed 1432 murders, 93 arsons, 37 thefts, and one plot to assassinate
the supreme leader. He is sentenced to die, in what textual evidence
shows as a predetermined verdict.
The verdict comes against the protest of the defense lawyer who
argues that there cannot be any verdict based on his client's earlier, and
perhaps coerced statement. In his words, " le prochs est inexistant tant
que l'accusation se fonde sur les aveux de ces m~mes accus6s qui n'ont
pas parl6 ... l'audience. Or l'aveu ne constitue plus depuis fort
longtemps une preuve suffisante en droit penal"[there is no basis for the
trial as long as the accusation is based on the confession of those who
have not spoken . .

.

the audience. Admission of guilt no longer

constitutes sufficient proof in criminal law] .22 The verdict underscores
how, in the society in question here, law and politics have become
strange bedfellows. It brings out the collusion between the legal system
and the power structure, both controlled by the dictatorship engaged, as it
were, in a mutual search for legitimacy. On the one hand, the power
structure shapes the legal system by appointing members of the
institution; on the other, those illegal and illegitimate regimes, have to
rely on the legal system for some form of legitimacy, including the
rubber stamping of rigged election results.
Exposing the corrupt nature of the imported legal system is also
one of the themes of COUS ROMPUS. 23 Aboubacar, one of the big farmers
in his society, finds himself entangled in a maze of deceit, manipulation,
and empty promises; all of which finally lead to his destitution and near
psychological breakdown. His pent-up emotions and resentment toward
the oppressive machinery of his society explode when he attacks the
director of the cooperative whose agent had not only extorted his money,
but had also manipulated him into giving the cooperative monopoly over
22 ALEXANDRE KUM'A NDUMBE, LE SOLEIL DE L' AURORE (1976).
23 MOUSTAPHA DATE, Cous ROMPUS (1978).
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buying his produce. While at the police station to file a suit of extortion
and abuse of power against the cooperative and its director, he is
arrested, charged with trespassing [for entering the premises of the
cooperative without permission], assault and battery with intent to inflict
bodily harm. During the trial, rather than respond to the judge's
questions or be constrained by the rules of evidence, Aboubacar
digresses into telling the court his own personal story; a story that seems
to highlight the collective plight of the subjugated, that is, all the farmers.
A written statement represents the plaintiff, still in recovery. Although
the contents of the statement are not known, one can assume that they are
fabrications. Following the defense counsel's plea for leniency in the
sentence citing his client's state of mind at the time he is alleged to have
assaulted the director, Aboubacar is sentenced to two years imprisonment
and a fine.
The verdict exemplifies a miscarriage of justice. It shows how in
that society "la loi du lion" [the law of the jungle] reigns. The rich and
the powerful can manipulate even the legal system such that it no longer
plays its role of conflict resolution or a mechanism for seeking the truth
and the administration of justice, but rather serves the interests of the
existing power structure; indeed, it can become machinery for the
oppression of the masses. Moreover, since litigants operate in two
different traditions to tell their story, one oral and the other written,
deciding on the case based on a written deposition may be a commentary
on Norris' statement earlier about the Western court's reliance on the
written word. In this context, it shows that the powerful have control
over the legal institution and the continued domination of indigenous
cultures by imported/imposed written cultures. The expeditious nature of
the case suggests that we are dealing with a parody of justice in that, as
in the case discussed earlier, the outcome seems to have been
predetermined based on the social status of the litigants. Knowing the
real societies that served as a context for these works, it will not be far
fetched to conclude that the judge had been bribed prior to the trial and
that the decision had already been made.
As in the preceding cases where there is interplay between
politics and law, L'AFRIQUE A PARLE might be said to deal not only with
a political trial but the trial of the indigenous legal system itself. The text
develops from the story of a stolen mask, which, as textual evidence
suggests, represents the African soul, indeed her past. Paulin, a
European, and obviously an outsider to the society had replaced Namori
the charlatan, a long time counselor to the chief in that position of
authority and power. As charlatan, one of his duties is using cauris to
detect thieves. Nonetheless, pushed by the desire for revenge against his
usurper, he manipulates the cauris to point to Paulin as the thief. But
when the mask is returned having been recovered from a vagrant, it
raises the crucial question of the reliability of this method as well as
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many others used in African societies to seek the truth. Indeed, who
determines what is true? What is truth? The deeper question is, what to
make of a society in which spider or tortoise divinations are held to be
authoritative evidence against someone accused of witchcraft or when
the poison oracle is relied upon to arrive at truth?
On the one hand, the indigenous legal systems that rely on
animals, objects and the interpretation of the actions of those diviners, by
one manipulating individual with absolute powers, come under scrutiny.
Having animals and objects participate in the truth-finding process
highlights the interconnectedness of various elements and the important
role that each component of an African society is called upon to play. On
the other hand, and more importantly, Paulin's trial might indeed be a
metaphor for the trial of Europe for her rapaciousness, for her continued
plundering of what is most intimate to the continent, her artefact. As one
character asks in disgust, "qui a pris l'essentiel des trasors de l'Egypte?
Qui a pris l'essentiel des tr6sors de l'Afrique occidentale et centrale? Qui
nous a ravi ce que l'Afrique ancienne destinait aux g6narations futures?
[Who has stolen the tresors of Egypt? Who has stolen west and central
African tresors? Who has robbed us of what ancestors had preserved for
future generations?].24 And his answers in respective order, "c'est
I'Europe!" "C'est I'Europe, toujours 1'Europe insatiable!". "C'est encore
l'ternelle Europe!' [It's Europe! It's Europe! Europe, always the
insatiable Europe! It's again the eternal Europe!] In fact these African
artistic expressions infused with some dynamic forces in the land of their
creativity and the vital force that makes them serve as the link between
the past and the future, have become simply lifeless objects displayed or,
indeed, stacked in 'warehouses' called museums.
Paulin uses the episode, however, to question not only the
arbitrary method of detection, since to him it is not based on logic, but
also to challenge the African conception of justice. As he asks, "est-ce 1i
la justice de l'Afrique? Peut-elle condamner sans avoir jug6?" [Is that
African justice? Can she condemn without trial?] .2 And to add rather
sarcastically, "ah l'Afrique! Est-elle donc le continent de la passion
aveuglante?" [Ah Africa! Is she the continent of blind passion?]. 26 His
juxtaposition of passion and lack of reason to question the system that
has condemned him is significant. For him, judgment must be carried out
in a court of law with lawyers, witnesses, police investigation, etc. All
elements of his European legal systems, rule-oriented systems in which
the emotive, the intuitive, and, as will be shown later, the spiritual have
been repressed.

24 MBAYE GANA KEBE, L'AFRIQUE PARLE (1972).

25 See id. at 42
26 See id. at 47
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Paulin's last question above would seem to suggest that in a
reversal of roles, Europe that he symbolizes, now finds herself on the
defensive for destabilizing many African structures including the legal
system now being used to judge her. Ironically, the king whose daughter
had killed herself in protest over what she perceived as a false accusation
against Paulin, calls for his people to get beyond their passions for their
legal structure. He comes out in defense of Paulin against the masses
including his counselors and wise men who are calling for the death of
the accused. Paulin's case raises the king's awareness about the
shortcomings of that particular method used in his society to determine
truth. The trial has, therefore, helped to illuminate some aspects of the
indigenous legal system, such as having blind faith in objects in major
decisions that could very well have to do with life and death. These
aspects, according to the king, urgently need revisions because they can
no longer serve the needs of today's constantly changing society.
As a clairvoyant leader, the king's re-evaluation of the system
that he has manipulated so far helps to bring all those who had called for
the death of Paulin to rethink their position and in so doing realign
themselves with their leader. This change of mindset by readily
accepting this outsider as one of their own, mechanical as it appears,
helps to bring about some form of reconciliation between Europe and
Africa which is the ultimate in trials carried in indigenous court settings.
As a reversal of the type of Manichean worldview of Europe as dominant
and Africa as the dominated that these textual elements have naturalized,
Paulin, who by all indication epitomizes the reverse metaphor, white skin
black mask, pleads that henceforth, he be judged by the content of his
character which is deeply African, rather than by the color of his skin
which is white.
If cauris are used to blur the boundaries between the physical
and mystic worlds, in LE PROCftS DU PILON (The Trial of the Pestle), the
pestle serves in a similar way. The play presents many cases tried in a
Western style court, but the most dramatic of all is the case of Malang
Dram6, the charlatan, licensed for over forty years as one who can use a
magic pestle to identify thieves. Following a case in which his pestle had
successfully detected the thieves who had stolen substantial sums of
money from the cooperative, Drama, is arrested and charged with
defamation. His trial dramatizes the dilemma faced by modem justice
based on written codes of law and traditional justice based on the occult
sciences. In the case in point here, the question becomes who is really on
trial, the person whose litanies empower the pestle or the pestle itself that
does the actual identification? In fact, when Dram6 is asked by the judge
to demonstrate his technique/art to the court, he is unable to do so,
because certain ideas or concepts cannot be translated from the mystical
language that conveys them to one understandable to the uninitiated.
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There is no way to explain the connection between the words of
the litanies he pronounces and the mystic forces that take hold of the
pestle and prompt it into action. And since such irrational, illogical
actions based on faith in the indigenous system have been repressed due
to evidentiary prohibitions or left out of the modem court system in the
name of disciplinary autonomy, it becomes impossible to attempt to
make sense out of them. When the crucial decision of determining the
truth is carried out by an object endowed, as it were, with exceptional
powers, the modem court whose raison d'tre is the search for truth loses
its authority. By the end of the trial, it is no longer simply the trial of an
individual or one legal system but that of two societies, the traditional
and the modem; two legal institutions, the indigenous represented by
Malang Dram's story and the imported that offers the structure or the
framework for the trial. As the defence lawyer puts it, "aujourd'hui il ne
s'agit pas de proc&s de mon client- il s'agit du prochs de cette Afrique
&cartelde- entre ses croyances qui sont effectivement des religions et le
modernisme import6" [today it is not the trial of my client-it is that of
an Africa tom between her beliefs which are effectively religions and
imported modernism] .27

As I have suggested elsewhere "any interpretation of legal
stories in African works of fiction must take into consideration ...

the

role of the ancestors ' 28 and "other supernatural agencies that act as third
parties in the management of cases., 29 These unseen agencies are
important components of the indigenous judicial process that have been
left out of rule-centered systems. A good illustration of supernatural
intervention in the trial process is LE FRUIT DIFENDU.3 ° The forbidden
fruit, as the title suggests, deals with the issue of transgression of moral
and ethical principles that forbid incestuous relationships. Mengue, a
fifteen year old girl, has been sent by her parents to live with her uncle in
the capital; as is customary on the continent. Upon her arrival she meets
her cousin Guillaume, the son of her uncle whose attitude begins to
suggest he sees his cousin as a sexual object that will help him challenge
taboos and established rules of his society. Therefore, he nurtures those
destructive passions for her by systematically attempting to negate their
blood relationship. He questions the definitions, the origins, and his
traditions that continue to uphold such taboos. He does everything to
alienate himself, at least psychologically, from his traditions.
27

OUSMANE GOUNDIAN, LE PROCESS DU PILON: PIECE EN QUATRE TABLEAUX (1980).

28 Emmanuel Yewah, Court Trials in African Fiction, 19 AFRICAN LITERATURE TODAY 80 (1994).

29

MICHAEL J. LOWRY, A GOOD NAME IS WORTH MORE THAN MONEY: STRATEGIES OF COURT USE

IN GHANA, THE DISPUTING PROCESS LAW IN TEN SOCIETIES, 188

1978).
30 AHANDA ESSOMBA, LE FRUIT DEFENDU (1975).

(Laura Nadar & Harry Todd eds.,
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As if pushed by some malefic forces, he subverts all the rules
physically by frequently going into her room unannounced;
philosophically, he thinks about her continuously, imagining both of
them engaged in violent sexual acts. He attempts to break down all the
walls between him and this forbidden fruit or what he has built into a
destructive object of desire. In a final act, these uncontrollable emotions
lead him to rape his cousin. Following weeks of trying to keep the secret
because of the violent loss of her purity and the fear of tearing their
family apart, and the threat of reprisal from her assailant, Mengue finally
decides to reveal her ordeal to her parents. Her uncle still in shock, in
denial, disbelief that his son could have committed such a hideous crime,
acquiesces to the village chief s call for a public hearing/confession in an
indigenous court setting.
However, while Mengue is testifying, her assailant who is finally
named in public slips away and disappears. Unfortunately for him, while
on the run, he gets into an accident in which he loses one of his legs.
Although the act of public purification takes place later, his accident at
that crucial moment is significant. This type of intervention in the
judicial process suggests that there is another crucial dimension to be
considered in court trials. And this is when competence in the culture
becomes important in that it helps to interpret this extralegal dimension
as perhaps orchestrated by fate, destiny or indeed by ancestral spirits who
act as real judges, while those that appear as real judges in the trials are
simply marionettes controlled from outside the court by those spiritual
forces.
Narratives that subvert the imported legal system find their most
vocal expression in T.M. Aluko's WRONG ONES IN THE DOCK The text
raises serious questions about the imported legal system, which is
presented as "truth-inhibiting." Jonathan Egbor and his son Paul have
been arrested and falsely charged with the murder of a woman. Textual
evidence shows that the woman's son had accidentally killed her during
his struggle with his father. During the trial, however, many people who
had witnessed the crime either refuse to testify for the accused or simply
tell lies in the witness box. Telling such lies might be out of fear of
reprisal from the community or the fear created by the aura of awe that
surrounds a courtroom. In one occasion, the blatant lie by a witness
draws this outburst from Egbor in defiance of court orders that demand
respect for the rules of evidence: "what kind of legal system was this that
saw a witness telling such awful lies on the so-called oath and yet wrote
down such evidence in the record of the court., 31 For him, he "did not
see any sense in a legal system in which a witness who tells a lie is
32
allowed to go unchallenged immediately while the lie is still hot.,
31 T.

MOFORUNSO ALUKO, WRONG ONE IN THE DOCK,

32 Id. at 164

(1982)

U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP.

L. REv.

VOL. 10

Egbor's outburst shows both his frustration and his attempt to break out
of the constraints imposed by a rule-centered system. As Virney Kirpal
notes,
"unlike the imported Western court system, in the African
indigenous courts system (in operation before colonialism), it was
normal for the accused to cry out that the man in the witness box
was lying, or that the judge himself was wrong. 'That is your
judgment,' he could say, and I tell you I don't accept it." 33 An
experienced judge, he concludes, "could always determine who was
telling the truth and who wasn't because the 34indigenous system had
a truth-establishing mechanism built into it.",
The courtroom as depicted in some of the texts is used to subvert
the legal ideology of the time and to develop alternative ideologies to the
dominant ones. Ngugi's THE TRIAL OF DEDAN KIMATHI 35 represents an
interesting example of that category. Although the amount of critical
studies on Ngugi is overwhelming, and has, to a large measure focused
on his Marxist ideology, his cultural/linguistic ethnocentrism or
nationalism, his anti-colonialist, anti-capitalist, anti-dictatorial positions,
few critics have examined his recourse to the indigenous and received
traditions in the law to articulate his views. THE TRIAL provides another
reading in that it reconstructs imaginatively the Kenyan colonial
experience envisioning, in Ngugi's words, "the world of the Mau Mau
and Kimathi in terms of peasants' and workers' struggle before and after
constitutional independence" (preface).36 The trial of Dedan Kimathi,
one of the leaders in the struggle for Kenyan independence, is used as a
vehicle to expose a capitalist legal ideology represented by the banker,
the businessman, the judge, all protected by a very strong police
presence, and by land laws to protect the property of the settlers. At the
same time, the text uses the trial scene to shape what might be called a
participatory legal ideology similar to that of the indigenous legal system
in which the court audience participates unrestrictedly in the proceedings
and in shaping the legal system since it is not based on precedent but
individualized. In this case, the masses or the workers' active
participation takes the form of a victory song and dance in reaction to
Kimathi' s conviction.
Such mass action in the courtroom presided over by a colonialist
not only violates the awe that surrounds it but also shows that the masses
conceive of law as an institution whose role is not to control people but
to be constantly shaped and revised by the people. In such a society, law
33 Virney Ki-pal, The Structure of the Modern Nigerian Novel and the National Consciousness,34
MODERN FICTION STUDIES 45 (Spring 1988).

34 Id. at 52-53
35 NGUGI WA THIONG'O, THE TRIAL OF DEDAN KIMATHI (1977).

36Id. at41
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is an adjudicative mechanism used to maintain order and restore social
equilibrium following a disruption as that caused by colonialism. In that
sense law is no longer just part of the superstructure reflecting "capitalist
control of political power" and, therefore, as serving the interests of the
ruling class, as in orthodox Marxism. It is no longer just a reflection of
"competing demands of society's interest groups, 3 7 with a strong
economic and political power to lobby, as in liberal democracies, but a
social institution serving the interests of the masses.
What comes out of the discussion is that while the trials are used
as a forum to subvert the structures and procedures in an imported
courtroom setting, extratextual, extralegal forces themselves manipulate
textual elements. The connection between these manipulations in the
various texts and the contexts of their production, that is, the current
socioeconomic and political realities of the African continent is evident.
Perhaps a look at dictatorships that today infest the continent will show
that while those monsters seem to have arrogated to themselves the
power to subvert all the structures of their societies, they are in turn
being manipulated by forces outside of the continent, forces on which
they depend economically for their continued existence. So the dramas
being played in these fictional courtrooms may be a sad commentary, or,
indeed, the dramas of the African continent itself that has fallen prey to
outside influences carefully channeled through their homegrown satraps.

37 Brooks, supra note 14, at 4.

